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Summary
Arguments have been made that the WTO should be extended to include multilateral disciplines on competition (antitrust) regimes. Rationales for this vary, but include a perception that private anticompetitive practices may restrict market access opportunities and effectively nullify or impair a country's trade liberalization commitments; assertions that national antitrust regimes may impose negative spillovers on other countries; that effective antitrust enforcement against finns with global market power requires a certain degree of harmonization of rules and cooperation between national enforcement agencies; and that a WTO agreement in the area of antitrust might prove to be an effective mechanism to constrain the use of contingent protection (antidumping).
Contingent protection, in particular antidumping, has become a major bone of contention in intemational trade relations. Perspectives on this issue vary widely, ranging from the perception that antidumping is an appropriate response to an activity that is condemned by the GATT to the view that antidumping is straightforward protectionism without any economic justification.
Somewhere in between are those who argue in favor of the use of antidumping on second best grounds. For example, the need for antidumping may be motivated on the basis that foreign firms are able to leverage entry restrictions in their home markets into an "unfair" competitive advantage in export markets, and that absent common rules on antitrust disciplines, antidumping is required to "level the playing field."
A working group has been established in the WTO with the mandate to explore the relationship between trade and competition policies. This group can draw on a significant amount of experience that has already been generated in this connection in the context of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). These illustrate that governments can agree to abolish antidumping on intraarea trade flows. They also reveal that governments have been able and willing to agree to common competition disciplines. This paper explores what the PTA experience suggests regarding the relationship between the attainment of intra-area free trade and the pursuit of "deep" integration--actions by member states to effectively harmonize national regulatory regimes. More specifically, the following two questions are asked: (i) does free trade require deep integration?; and (ii) if so, is agreement on antitrust a necessary element of such deep integration?
Many economists are of the view that insofar as dumping is potentially an economic problem for an importing nation, it can and should be dealt with through enforcement of national competition law. This can be done unilaterally--there is no need for international agreement or harmonization of competition regimes. The implication is that if governments desire to form a free trade area there is no need to negotiate common antitrust rules as a precondition for the abolition of antidumping. Others argue that antidumping is a strategic tool that firms/governments use to counteract the extraterritorial impact of differences in domestic policies and that consequently that common competition disciplines are required in PTAs in order to abolish antidumping. This paper argues that the economic and empirical basis for such "linkage" is questionable. The regional experience illustrates that shallow integration--unconditional free trade--may be associated with the pursuit of a deeper integration agenda. However, the linkages that are sometimes argued to exist in practice between antidumping elimination and enforcement of common antitrust disciplines tend to be driven by a broader agenda that revolves around the attainment of economic integration (e.g., the creation of a "single" market). Although agreement on common antitrust disciplines is not necessary to eliminate antidumping, common disciplines in other regulatory areas affecting competition between firms in each jurisdiction may be needed to completely remove the reach of contingent protection.
In practice, the demise of antidumping in PTAs may be constrained because governments are concerned about the potential for their partners to engage in beggar-thy-neighbor industrial policies. They may consider antidumping a useful defensive instrument in this connection, because it can be used as a substitute for instruments like countervailing duties which have a much higher "foreign policy content" and may be more difficult to pursue. If so, it must be recognized that antidumping is a particularly ineffective and costly instrument. Indeed, a case can be made that this is another reason to eliminate it in the PTA context as this will help focus attention on the real source of problems (industrial policies; government intervention), rather than on the symptoms (allegations of "unfair dumping").
Introduction
Contingent protection, in particular antidumping, has become a major bone of contention in international trade relations. Perspectives on this issue vary widely, ranging from the perception that antidumping is an appropriate response to an activity that is condemned by the GATT to the view that antidumping is straightforward protectionism without any economic justification.
A tentative start has been made in the WTO context to initiate discussions on the subject.
A working group has been established with the mandate to explore the relationship between trade and competition policies. The work program for this group has been heavily contested, as was its terms of initial reference. Strong opposition exists on the part of import competing industries in a number of countries against any effort to discipline the reach of antidumping through the introduction of linkages to antitrust principles.' Conversely, some competition authorities are opposed to the introduction of antitrust into WTO because of a worry that antitrust enforcement might become affected by trade policy considerations.
1/ This was illustrated in the Singapore Ministerial meeting of the WTO in December 1996 where the United States and the EU jointly agreed on a statement "clarifying" that the Ministerial declaration establishing a working group on trade and competition policy "is specifically directed at a work plan addressing antitrust issues and will not affect domestic antidumping standards and provisions." Statement on Competition Policy, USTR press release 96-95, 13 December 1996. Or, to cite the business view expressed in a 1996 ACTPN report on competition policy: "As long as exporters may engage in dumping, there will be a need for national antidumping laws" (http://www.ustr.gov/reports/actpn/policy.html). See Hoekman (1997) for a discussion and references to the rapidly expanding literature on this topic. It is well known that many PTAs have not eliminated the reach of trade policy--governments often exempt certain sectors and retain the right to impose antidumping, countervailing duty and "emergency" protection. The focus of attention in this paper is limited to
PTAs that have managed to abolish the scope to pursue such actions and thos_ where serious attempts have been (are being) made to do so by one or more members. In reviewing the approaches that have been taken in PTAs concerning the elimination of trade policy on intra-area trade, particular attention will be given to one dimension of deeper integration: the extent of any linkage to the adoption of antitrust disciplines. Many economists are of the view that insofar as dumping is potentially an economic problem for an importing nation, it can and should be dealt with through enforcement of national competition law (Finger, 1993; Hoekman and Mavroidis, 1996) . This can be done unilaterally--there is no need for international agreement or harmonization of competition regimes. The implication is that if governments desire to form a free trade area there is no need to negotiate common antitrust rules as a precondition for the 2 abolition of antidumping. Others argue that antidumping is a strategic tool that firms/governments use to counteract the extraterritorial impact of differences in domestic policies and that consequently the "capacity of firms and governments to reach directly restrictive business practices wherever they take place within the regional area is a pre-condition sine qua non, before antidumping measures can be effectively phased out" (Marceau, 1995, pp. 35-36) .
That is, it is claimed that common competition disciplines are required in PTAs in order to abolish antidumping.
This paper argues that the economic and empirical basis for this line of reasoning is questionable. Section II defines terms and discusses the economics of trade policy-antitrust linkages. Section III reviews the evidence offered by PTAs that have been established since the second World War involving countries that have tended to use contingent protection relatively intensively--Australia, Canada, Western Europe, and the US--as well as several "new entrants" such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. Section IV summarizes the regional experience and draws some tentative lessons. Section V turns briefly to some implications of the regional experience for the reform of multilateral disciplines on PTAs. Section VI concludes.
II. Definitions and Conceptual Issues
As average tariffs of industrialized countries have fallen (to less than five percent currently) and quantitative restrictions been abolished, international negotiations have increasingly centered on domestic regulatory policies that are alleged to impede the ability of foreign firms and products to contest a market. Examples of the latter include technical regulations that aim to safeguard public health or the environment, and licensing or certification requirements for service providers. Dealing with such "behind the border" policies has been termed "deeper integration"
in the literature, 2 in contrast with the "shallow" integration that has been the staple of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which revolves around reducing the prevalence of measures applied at the border (tariffs, quotas). Rather than use the border-nonborder distinction, in this paper shallow integration is defined to comprise actions to eliminate discrimination between foreign and domestic firms-i.e., to apply the principle of national treatment. This implies not only zero tariffs and quotas, but also the abolition of contingent protection. Deep integration consists of explicit actions by governments to reduce the market segmenting effect of differences in national regulatory policies that pertain to products, production processes, producers and natural persons. In practice this will require decisions: (i) that a partner's policies are equivalent (mutual recognition); or (ii) to adopt a common regulatory stance in specific areas (harmonization). The latter approach may be complemented by decisions to cede enforcement authority to a supra-national entity. There are two possible motivations for deeper integration efforts, and more specifically, why antitrust might figure on the agenda of a trade agreement. The first is that there are gains from cooperation in this particular area and an international trade agreement allows these to be attained. The second is that common disciplines on competition policy are necessary to achieve the objective of regional free trade (shallow integration). In the first case, a distinction must be made between situations where national competition policies result in outcomes that are suboptimal (inefficient) from a joint welfare perspective and those where they do not. In The case for inclusion of competition policy in a PTA becomes more compelling if the situation ex ante is akin to a zero sum game: efficient national enforcement of competition policies reduces the welfare of a trading partner or there are costs involved for a country to move its competition regime to conform more closely to that of a partner. 4 Here the issue becomes a distributional one, as moving away from the status quo ante may impose a loss on a country. Alternatively, there may be scope for increasing joint welfare through coordination of antitrust, but interest groups that would lose from a move to a more efficient (joint) outcome may be able to block this (insist on compensation). In such cases, side-payments are required to achieve agreement to adopt common competition regimes. Such side-payments may be easier to realize in the context of a broader trade agreement that has a large number of issues on the negotiating agenda. Indeed, they may be a necessary condition for deeper integration.
A second possible rationale for the introduction of antitrust on the agenda of a PTA is that governments regard common competition disciplines as a necessary condition for achieving shallow integration (the elimination of trade policy). Most PTAs have tended to be imperfect in the sense that many holes and loopholes are maintained that imply that intraregional free trade is not achieved for a long period of time, if ever. Whole sectors may be 3/ Although this is not to say that existing arrangements are adequate. Many observers have concluded that such bilateral cooperation between competition authorities could benefit from substantial strengthening and expansion. See e.g., Commission of the European Communities (1995).
4/ This is not unlikely to be a frequent occurrence in practice, given the significant differences in the substantive provisions and interpretations of competition law across even OECD countries and he prevalence of exemptions for export cartels. See, e.g., Boner and Krueger (1991) for a review of national rules and provisions.
excluded from the ambit of liberalization and a variety of instruments of contingent protection may continue to be applicable to intra-area trade. Full achievement of shallow integration therefore has been more the exception than the rule. This raises the question whether shallow integration requires introduction of deeper integration elements into the process, and, in particular, common disciplines in the area of antitrust.'
Logically, there at least four "types" of PTAs: (i) those that achieve unconditional internal free trade ( may be the case that no link is between trade and antitrust is perceived to be necessary and that agreement on common antitrust disciplines simply reflects the existence of gains from cooperation in this area. This might just as well have been pursued independently of the PTA 5/ Strong statements can be found in the legal literature implying that the answer is positive. For example: "..antidumping measures can be phased out between two countries only if and when: standards for transnational restrictive business practices (RBPs) exist; private firms have legal standing before the courts of the territory where the RBP takes place to enforce these standards; and/or when this issue is dealt with before domestic courts (other than that of the territory where the RBP takes place), the market of reference is transnational and the domestic courts are entitled to address transnational issues" (Marceau, 1995, p. 53) .
and in the absence of the PTA might have been. 6 Finally, it may be that shallow integration does not require deeper integration, but cooperation on antitrust requires side payments. These may be achieved by linking cooperation on antitrust to the broader agenda of the PTA.
Distinguishing between these three situations in cases where PTAs embody both shallow and deep integration is important in understanding the role of antitrust disciplines in trade agreements. The more one observes instances of the first situation the greater the likelihood that agreement on antitrust will be necessary in the WTO if the multilateral trading system is to move further down the path towards free trade. Unfortunately, characterizing real world PTAs on the basis of this three-fold typology may not be straightforward. Recourse will have to be made to statements by the governments involved in such agreements, as well as the specific language and drafting/negotiating history of each agreement.
Why Link Abolition ofAntidumping to Common Antitrust Rules?
Before reviewing the regional experience it is helpful to discuss briefly the most interesting type of PTA: those where deep integration is held to be a necessary condition for shallow integration.
Specifically, why might governments be unwilling to abolish antidumping unless an agreement on common antitrust standards can be negotiated? Possible rationales for antidumping are to protect domestic agents from predatory (monopolizing) dumping (Viner, 1923) 6/ This is the case among NAFTA members, for example, where common antitrust rules were not adopted but where national authorities have concluded a variety of bilateral cooperation agreements. These are pursued independently of the FTA (see below).
Predation is the standard economic potential rationale for antidumping. Predatory dumping arises if a foreign firm (or cartel) seeks to force domestic competitors to exit the market by pricing below cost (with the intention of raising prices once the competition has exited). It has been pointed out frequently that if there is predation, national antitrust should in principle be able to address the problem and that there is no need for common antitrust disciplines. More important, predation is unlikely to be a strategy that is often used by firms. In practice, research suggests it is very much the exception, not the rule in antidumping cases. 7 Indeed, in real world antidumping actions an antitrust authority would not have intervened on competition, let alone predation, grounds (Messerlin, 1996; Sch6ne, 1996) . The consensus among most observers is that antidumping as it is practiced today in the major jurisdictions has nothing to do with predation.
This leaves the second possible rationale for antidumping: a strategic policy instrument that aims to affect a country's terms of trade. Assuming a PTA aims to achieving free trade (eliminate trade policy), governments may be concerned to constrain the ability of other members to use alternative instruments (such as antitrust or subsidies) to circumvent the free trade goal. Absent such agreements, contingent protection may be seen an insurance mechanism to offset the strategic use by other member governments of policies that could reduce domestic welfare. This line of argument puts foreign government policy in the center of attention. The issue then is to determine if targeting individual firms (as antidumping does) is an efficient way of dealing with such foreign government policies. This depends in part on the source of the "problem". One possibility is that foreign firms benefit from high trade barriers that protect their 7/ There are many reasons for this, including the difficulty of restricting entry in the future and the likelihood that the importing country government would regulate the resulting monopoly (or cartel).
home market, and that antidumping is seen as an instrument with which to put pressure on the foreign government to reduce such barriers (Stewart, 1996) . However, given that in the PTA context presumably the objective is to eliminate trade barriers, this line of reasoning implies that antidumping should be removed once "classic" trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas have been eliminated. No link with antitrust is required. 8
Another possible "problem policy" is foreign antitrust. This may have a negative effect on domestic welfare. For example, a merger between foreign finns that is allowed by the foreign antitrust authorities may result in an increase in export prices. The larger the share of the foreign entity in domestic consumption the more likely the resulting decline in consumer surplus will exceed the increase in producer surplus of import-competing firms (Ordover and Willig, 1984; Dixit, 1984 Dixit, , 1998 Barros and Cabral, 1994) . This is a variant of the export cartel issue-an antitrust authority of an industry that mostly exports (or where behavior on the home market can be regulated) has an incentive to allow the formation of export cartels as it improves the terms of trade. The relevant question in this context is what antidumping can do to counteract the effect of a "nationalistic" foreign antitrust policy. The answer is: very little. Whether trade policy in general (tariffs) may offset (some of) the welfare reducing effect of the increase in foreign market power depends on a number of factors, including market structure and demand. Collie (1997) concludes that in this type of situation tariffs may have a positive or negative effect and are inferior to domestic production subsidies. In any event, antidumping is not very relevant in this context as the effect of greater concentration (market power) is to increase export prices, thus reducing the probability of dumping. One can also question whether (the threat of) an 8/ As noted below, in a number of PTAs where the elimination of antidumping has been achieved or is an objective, abolition was (is) linked to the transition period for phasing out tariffs (e.g., the EC and free trade agreements between Canada and Chile, and between Australia and New Zealand).
antidumping duty can put pressure on affected firms in the export market to lobby their government to pursue a more vigorous antitrust stance-or to consider amending its practices to conform more closely with those demanded by its trading partner. This is because current antidumping enforcement takes no account of whether price discrimination or selling below cost is a function of a "strategic" antitrust stance by the home government of an exporter.
It is sometimes argued that as countries move to eliminate trade policies, they may perceive that possible negative spillovers due to differences in national antitrust regimes will increase after the achievement of free trade. That is, the incentive to use antitrust strategically may increase: once free trade is achieved, government's may shift to alternative instruments to shift foreign profits or surplus to domestic agents. However, analysts that have explored this issue question whether the abolition of trade policy will give rise to greater incentives to use antitrust strategically, even in areas where it would seem most easily applied--e.g., merger policies and export cartels (Horn and Levinsohn, 1996; Motta and Onida, 1996) .
A final potential "strategic" rationale for antidumping is as an instrument to counteract foreign industrial policies such as investrnent restrictions, subsidies and state involvement in industry. Such government support may give rise to significant negative repercussions on domestic firms. Consequently, the less PTAs do to control industrial policies of governments, the greater the resistance may be to giving up "commercial defense" instruments. There are valid theoretical economic justifications for the use of countervailing duties. Indeed, partial countervailing of a foreign export subsidy can be the optimal response by an importing country (Dixit, 1988; Collie, 1991) . However, in general contingent protection is an inefficient instrument to deal with the effects of foreign subsidies or industrial policies as it imposes additional deadweight costs on domestic consumers without greatly increasing the incentives of the foreign government to change its ways (Deardorff and Stem, 1987) . The appropriate policy is to draft rules that restrict the ability of a PTA member to use industrial policies in ways that are detrimental to the welfare of other member countries. In practice, this may be difficult to achieve, as is illustrated in many PTAs. If so, governments may seek to continue to pursue subsidy and/or countervail policies in part motivated by strategic considerations. But antidumping should not have a role to play in this connection as it does not focus on the existence of detrimental foreign export subsidies as a precondition for action. Of course, it may be a substitute for countervailing duties for exactly that reason: there is no need to confront foreign governments with allegations that their subsidy policies are detrimental to domestic industries. Indeed, it may be defended as allowing non-subsidy-based industrial policies to be targeted as well. But that is no virtue.
Instead, this illustrates one of the major problems with antidumping from an economic policy perspective-it allows proponents to hide behind the cover of vague allegations of "unfair" trade
practices without specifying what these are.
There has been a lot of research on the incentive effects of antidumping. 9 This has concluded that antidumping can have a pro-competitive impact in situations of oligopolistic rivalry. However, once rent-seeking incentives are recognized, account is taken of the fact that antidumping as actually applied does not consider the variables that matter from a strategic point of view, and that the possible "spillover" effects of antidumping on downstream industries can be significant (Hoekman and Leidy, 1992) , in practice it is much more likely that antidumping has a detrimental effect on domestic welfare. Moreover, given the technical and "automatic' nature of antidumping and the fact that it is driven by private petitions, it is difficult to conceive of antidumping being used as an effective strategic instrument by governments.
Arguments that a necessary condition for the elimination of antidumping in the PTA-2/ See, e.g., Dixit (1988) , Leidy and Hoekman (1990) , Messerlin (1990) , Reitzes (1993) , Staiger and Wolak (1989; , Veugelers and Vandenbussche (1997) .
context (or in the WTO context for that matter) is the adoption of common competition rules are therefore not compelling. Insofar as the fear is predation, this can be achieved by the application of domestic antitrust. If the fear is foreign "strategic" policy, be it antitrust-related or more general industrial policies, antidumping can do little to address the problem. Antidumping as currently practiced is predominantly simple protectionism (Finger, 1993) . There is therefore nothing special about antidumping that requires linkages to other policy areas-as just another
form of trade policy it should be eliminated in conjunction with tariffs and quotas more generally as a PTA is implemented.
III. Regional Trade Agreements
Many preferential trade agreements have been negotiated over the years. Competition policy in general and antitrust in particular has played an important role in only few of these agreements.
However, a number of the more recent agreements have pursued common antitrust disciplines.
What follows looks at a number of PTAs that have gone far towards achieving either full free trade (shallow integration) or have sought to incorporate disciplines on antitrust. As noted earlier, the main focus of interest is to determine whether cooperation extends to the area of competition law and if so, what can be said about whether this appears to be a necessary condition for achieving free trade. Given the voluminous literature that exists on most of the PTAs considered here, the discussion will be succinct.' 0
European Economic Community (EEC)
The EEC (now the European Union) is unique in that it involves the complete liberalization of JQ/ This section draws in part on Hoekman and Mavroidis (1996) and on Hoekman (1998) . In short, common disciplines are imposed on Member states with respect to state aids (subsidies), monopolies, government procurement practices, and antitrust. These are complemented by detailed European legislation relating to the achievement of the Internal Market. These disciplines have direct effect (supercede national law) and are enforced by 11/ Dominance is determined on the basis of the relevant product and geographic markets; abuse may involve unfair trading, price discrimination, tie-ins, bundling, or restricting output or access to markets.
12/ State monopolies of a commercial character must also ensure nondiscrimination regarding the conditions under which goods are procured and marketed between EC nationals (Article 37 ECT).
supranational bodies (the Commission and the European Court of Justice) as well as by national courts. The various competition provisions were considered necessary in order to achieve the objective of creating an integrated European market. As has been emphasized many times by the European institutions and numerous commentators, the goal is to ensure a "level playing field" or "equal competitive opportunities" on European markets for suppliers originating in member states.' 3 This "trade effects" focus has implied that in the enforcement of EC antitrust rules (Arts.
85-86) the Commission and Court may pursue a more "interventionist" policy stance than a national antitrust authority. The latter will generally be concerned with national welfare, and will balance the various economic effects of potential anticompetitive measures. In the EC context, the application of Arts. 85 and 86 is concerned as well with whether specific actions by entities are consistent with the objective of market integration (i.e., do not restrain intra-EC trade)." 4
A noteworthy feature of the EC regime is that no efforts were made to harmonize national antitrust regimes, which differed very substantially across countries. Indeed, some members states did not even have antitrust legislation; Italy adopted a comprehensive antitrust statute only in 1990 (Siragusa and Scassellati-Sforzolini, 1992) . Particularly for smaller states this implied that EC rules had little impact, as the affected markets could easily be too small to satisfy the "trade effect test". In such cases effective enforcement requires that national authorities take the lead. If for whatever reason this does not occur, EC competition rules may be largely 13/ For more comprehensive discussions of the EC, see e.g., Bourgeois (1992) , Brittan (1990) and Ehlermann (1992) .
14/ This may lead to findings by the EC institutions that are inappropriate from a "pure" economic efficiency viewpoint. Treatment of vertical agreements provides an example. Exclusive distribution agreements between a producer in one country and a distributor in another may fall foul of EC law even if vigorous interbrand competition (including from imports) exists on all EC markets because the agreement implies market partitioning. See Weatherill and Beaumont (1993, Chapter 22) for an extensive discussion.
irrelevant." 5 Over time greater attention has come to be centered on the adoption of more effective national antitrust legislation in member states. For example, in 1983 Portugal drafted and adopted its antitrust legislation in part with a view to its future accession to the EC (Barros and Mata, 1996) , and a number of member states have amended their statutes over time to conform more closely to the letter and spirit of EC rules. To some extent this has been driven by the EC Merger Regulation, which requires that national bodies exist to review mergers or acquisitions if these are referred to them by the European Commission, and by a more general concern to implement the principle of subsidiarity (in the process reducing somewhat the burden of enforcement that is carried by the Commission and the Court)." 6
As mentioned, the primary focus of the European Commission and the Court of Justice has been on contesting measures (public and private) that segment national markets. Facilitation of arbitrage has therefore been an important objective. This is perhaps best illustrated in the extensive case law pertaining to Article 30 (prohibiting the use of quantitative restrictions and measures with equivalent effect) and the Cassis de Dijon decision which led to adoption of the principle of mutual recognition for standards (Weatherill and Beaumont, 1993, Chapter 15) . But it is also reflected in the vigorous enforcement of competition provisions on the behavior of private agents and States that prevent arbitrage across markets. An example is the ban on restrictions on parallel imports-preventing distributors of a product from selling to entities that have the intention of re-selling the products in other member states.
The Treaty of Rome prohibits antidumping on intra-area trade once the transition period for full implementation of the treaty provisions has expired. However, during the transition 15/ For an example, see Fingleton (1996) , who argues that this was the case in Ireland until passage of new legislation in 1991.
16/ See Neven, Nuttall and Seabright (1993) for an analysis of the EC's Merger Regulation.
period, members were permitted to petition the European Commission for authorization to impose antidumping (Art. 91).'7 No formal linkage was established between the application of the common competition rules (or national antitrust) and the elimination of antidumping; instead the presumption appears to have been that once tariffs and quotas had been removed, antidumping should go as well. It might be argued that there is an informal linkage, as Art. 91 is in the competition-related section of the ECT, preceded by provisions regarding anticompetitive practices by undertakings and followed by a provision dealing with state aids. However, this cannot be seen as evidence of a strong antidumping-antitrust link as the criteria of Articles 85-86 are very different from those that are applied in antidumping. Consequently, the argument that the EC is a prime example of a PTA where antidumnping was removed because of a perception that the common antitrust disciplines could deal with the "problem" of dumping is not very compelling. Instead, the view was taken that antidumping could have no place in a common market.
The European Economic Area (EEA)
The EEA was negotiated between the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states (minus Switzerland) and the EU in 1992. It involves the former adopting much of the EC's acquis communautaire, including not only the EC's competition rules for firms and governments but also some 1,600 pieces of EC legislation (Norberg, 1992) .18 The EEA built upon free trade 17/ During the transition period, Article 91:2 required that products originating in one Member state and exported to another be free of duties, quotas and measures with similar effect if they are re-imported. Thus, during the transitional period governments were required to ensure that arbitrage between markets was not impeded by maximizing the incentive for consumers of the exporting country to re-import dumped goods. Transition periods varied across new members.
18/ The main exception is that the EU's Common Policies (such as agriculture and external trade) are not adopted by the EFTA states.
agreements negotiated between the EC and the EFTA states in the early 1 970s. These contained disciplines on the application of competition policies, notwithstanding which the EC continues to extend the reach of anti-dumping to EFTA-based exporters. The abolition of antidumping duties in the EEA was one of the negotiating goals of the former EFTA countries, as their exporters sought to eliminate the threat of such actions completely (Hindley and Messerlin, 1993) . This was achieved: Article 26 EEA states: "Anti-dumping measures, countervailing duties and measures against illicit commercial practices attributable to third countries shall not be applied in relations between the Contracting Parties, unless otherwise specified in this agreement." 19 Given adoption of the acquis and the effective extension of the EU Single Market to EEA members, clearly there was no option for the EU to retain antidumping. As in the EC proper, the driving force behind abolition of antidumping was the creation of a single market. Deep integration played an important part in this process, as reflected in the numerous directives and regulations that were adopted. But antitrust regimes per se did not.
Enforcement of the EC competition disciplines is similar as in the EC proper, through a mix of direct effect (allowing the rules to be invoked by firms before the courts) and supranational enforcement. However, the latter task is shared between two institutions: the European Commission and the EFTA Surveillance Body (the EFTA analogue of the Commission). It was agreed that the latter has jurisdiction if at least one third of the turnover of the firm(s) subject to complaint is in EFTA states.
The EEA is a free trade area, not a customs union, suggesting that whatever other necessary conditions must be satisfied for elimination of antidumping, a common trade policy 19/ The exceptions are listed in a protocol which states that it only applies to the areas covered by the provisions of the EEA in which the Community acquis is fully integrated (thus excluding agriculture); and that it is without prejudice to any measures which may be introduced to avoid circumvention of anti-dumping or similar measures by third countries.
vis-a-vis non-members is not required. Indeed, the EU illustrates that antidumping can co-exist with a customs union. Thus, in the customs union with Turkey, European firms may continue to petition for antidumping actions to be imposed on Turkish exports (see Togan, 1997) .
EUAgreements with Eastern European and Mediterranean Countries
Starting in the early 1 990s, the EU initiated a process of negotiating Association agreements with neighboring countries. 2 0 These commit signatories to achieve free trade on a reciprocal basis, usually over a transition period ranging from 10 to 12 years. As in the EEA, in the so-called Despite the agreement to adopt EU-compatible competition disciplines there is no analogue to Art. 91 ECT in the Europe Agreements specifying that antidumping will be phased out or eliminated. EU firms will therefore be permitted to engage in price discrimination or sell below cost on the EU market, whereas CEE firms will be constrained in pursuing such a strategy by the existence of EU antidumping procedures. On EU markets, price discrimination by CEE firms in the sense of selling products at prices below those charged at home may lead to antidumping petitions if this injures EU firms (Hoekman and Mavroidis, 1995) .
20/ Formally, the EEA is also an Association Agreement under Art. 238 ECT.
21/ State-aid, compatible with EU rules for disadvantaged regions (Article 92.3a ECT), may be applied to the entire territories of the associated states during the first five years, and transition periods of 3 and 5 years were granted for abiding with Arts. 90 and 37 disciplines. Cooperation between the EU and CEE antitrust authorities is based on the principle of positive comity (this grants a state whose interests are affected the legal option of requesting another state to initiate appropriate enforcement proceedings in its market). The situation is similar in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership agreements that have been Holmes (1996, p.5) , in practice the EU is requiring its partners (future members) to adapt national competition rules to the EU's standards in a much more rigorous fashion than has been done by existing member states. A recent survey by Pittman (1997) documents that the CEE countries have already gone far down the harmonization road.
therefore less far-reaching than the Europe Agreements, and it should come as no surprise that instruments of contingent protection remain applicable to intra-area trade flows. 23
The occurred. 2 7 ANZCERTA also unifies the labor market of the two countries (there is free mobility of labor), and contains relatively far-reaching commitments to liberalize trade in services. It is therefore similar to the EU in that the objective is to move towards the establishment of a single "trans-Tasman" market. As an instrument of protection, antidumping was inconsistent with the 25/ A facilitating factor could be that antidumping had become increasingly difficult to obtain. Between 1983 and 1988, New Zealand initiated 39 dumping investigations against Australia. Of these only two led to an affirmative finding. Similarly, Australia imposed duties in only 3 of 34 cases during this period (Ahdar, 1991) .
26/ Lloyd, 1 9 9 1, p. 2 4 27/ As of the mid 1990s, Australian FDI stocks in New Zealand equaled US $8 billion, equivalent to 25 percent of the stock of inward FDI. The comparable figure for New Zealand FDI in Australia was US $5 billion, or 5 percent ofthe total stock. Kahler (1996, p. 1 10) notes that a factor constraining extension of CER to cover investment is the Treaty of Nara between Australia and Japan, which would require that Australia extend any benefits granted New Zealand in this area to Japan.
realization of this objective.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
Both the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and its successor NAFTA substantially liberalize trade and investment flows between signatories. However, NAFTA does little to discipline the use of subsidies-it simply restates the existing multilateral (WTO) disciplines and remedies in this area-or to apply common competition disciplines to intra-NAFTA trade. Antidumping remains applicable to internal trade flows. Despite the Canadian government's interest in disciplining the use of antidumping, negotiators were unable to move far down the path towards elimination. Although ostensibly antidumping and antitrust were not linked in the negotiations, in part this may have reflected differences in the competition rules and their enforcement in the member countries, (e.g., triple damages in the US; rights of private action for breach of competition rules). But the major factor underlying the failure of the Canadian government to remove the threat of antidumping appears to have been the strength of the US lobby that supported the continued existence of antidumping.
As a result, the approach taken in NAFTA towards antidumping was limited to introducing mechanisms to ensure that domestic legislation is applied correctly. Independent binational panels may be called upon to review final antidumping determinations under the domestic law of each party. Moves to agree to link the abolition of antidumping to the implementation of common disciplines on antitrust, subsidies or exclusive rights are not on the agenda. This is not to say there is no recognition of potential gains from cooperation in these areas. For example, as far as antitrust is concerned, parties have agreed to apply the positive comity principle and are engaged in a process of discussing the trade-competition policy interface. Article 1504 of the NAFTA established a working group on trade and competition.
This group is required to report to the NAFTA Commission on issues concerning the relationship between antitrust law and policy and intra-NAFTA trade before the end of 1998. This working group has mostly focused on a comparison of competition legislation in the three member states with a view to determine whether differences have any implications for intra-NAFTA trade. A perusal of the working group's 1997 interim report on its activities suggests that antidumping has not figured prominently in the discussions. 2 8 Instead the focus has been on the application and possible trade effects of competition law enforcement.
MERCOSUR
The Southern Cone Market (Mercado Commun del Sur-MERCOSUR) was established in 1991 29 It is a common market and therefore has a common external tariff (implemented in 1995). The MERCOSUR treaty was amended in December 1994 to include a variety of institutional provisions, including on dispute settlement. In contrast to the EU-also a common market-there are no provisions for supranational enforcement of the agreement; disputes tend to be settled through negotiation.
While GATT Article XIX type safeguard actions ("emergency protection") on intra-MERCOSUR trade were prohibited as of the beginning of 1995, antidumping actions remain possible on internal trade. However, this possibility is intended to be temporary, and it is envisaged that antidumping will be eliminated once agreements has been reached on a set of 28/ "Interim Report of the NAFTA 1504 Working Group to the NAFTA Commission" February 1997.
29/ The agreement was notified to the WTO under the Tokyo Round Enabling Clause, which exempts developing countries from establishing full conformity of the agreement with the WTO rules on economic integration (Art. XXIV GATT and Art. V GATS) (Laird, 1997, p. 3). Laird (1997) provides a detailed description of the provisions and implementation of MERCOSUR.
"Common Rules on the Defense of Internal Competition." The question whether antidumping is to be maintained is to be reviewed by December 2000. MERCOSUR members have initiated a process to harmonize national competition laws and create a mechanism for coordinated action to prevent anticompetitive practices (Rowat, Lubrano and Porrata 1997) .3° In December 1996 a
Protocol for the Defense of Competition within MERCOSUR was adopted. This establishes a prohibition on concerted practices that restrict or distort competition and affect trade between member states, and gives MERCOSUR institutions the power to enforce these rules, although implementation remains the responsibility of national competition agencies. 3 " Progress is therefore being made which may allow antidumping to be eliminated at some point in the coming years. Presently, however, antidumping continues to be applied. For example, Argentina initiated 33 antidumping cases on imports from Brazil during the 1992-96 period, making Brazil the number one target for such actions (Tavares and Tineo, 1997).
In sum, it appears that Mercosur is following an approach that resembles ANZCERTA, with elements of the EU regime as well. The reach of competition policy disciplines are conditional upon a trade effects test; there will be a common external trade policy at some point;
but competition policy will be enforced by national bodies. There is no explicit requirement or commitment that antidumping on intra-area trade will be eliminated, or any formal statement to the effect that in principle antidumping has no place in a common market. However, this is on the agenda: members are committed to review the situation by the end of 2000.
30/ Decision 21/94, "Basic Elements of the Defense of Competition in MERCOSUR," December 14, 1996.
31/ As MERCOSUR institutions operate by consensus, a national competition authority will have the option of refusing to implement a decision. The Protocol must be ratified by parliaments of members states before it becomes effective. Some countries have yet to create the necessary institutions (e.g., Uruguay and Paraguay).
Canada-Chile
In early 1996 Canada and Chile initiated negotiations to establish a bilateral FTA. It was envisaged that such an FTA would be an "interim" agreement to provide a bridge to full NAFTA accession for Chile. 32 An agreement was concluded within one year. It is an interesting agreement because it goes beyond NAFTA by eliminating antidumping. 33 As in the EU, elimination is conditional upon the abolition of tariffs and NTBs: antidumping on specific products ceases to be applicable on intra-FTA trade on the date that tariffs on that product are eliminated (defined at the 8-digit level). In no case is this period to extend beyond January 1, 27 cause for concern. Given the strategic dimension that possibly underlies the bilateral elimination of antidumping in Canada-Chile context, it is too soon to claim that progress can be made on the antidumping front in the absence of "deeper" integration. 3 4 Nonetheless, the agreement has set a precedent by revealing that antidumping can be "delinked" from the problem of disciplining industrial policies.
Prospective Agreements: the FTAA and APEC
Given their prominence it is perhaps useful to discuss briefly the two major regional initiatives and policy in APEC.
There appears to have been little effort to link the antidumping and antitrust issue areas.
The implications of a "competition framework" for various regulatory areas is one of the dimensions of the competition policy work program, and trade remedies are part of this agenda.
However, given the US antipathy to address this issue, the limited attention that seems to have been given to antidumping as an "anticompetitive" practice is not surprising. Given that any principles that may be agreed upon in the competition area will be non-binding, it appears likely that antidumping will continue to figure in APEC trade relations for some time to come.
Similar to the APEC process, in the FTAA context efforts are also being devoted in a working group on competition policy to exploring possible modalities for cooperation. The terms of reference of the relevant working group are to compile a database/inventory of national legislation and practices, exchange views on the application/operation of competition policy regimes and their relationship to trade in a free trade area, and make specific recommendations on how to proceed in the construction of the FTAA in this area (OAS, 1997) . Between May 1996 and July 1997 the working group met four times. A working group on subsidies, antidumping and countervailing duties was also created. This group has mostly engaged in a process of information collection and exchange, with a particular emphasis placed on eliminating remaining agricultural export subsidies and other trade distorting measures affecting agriculture.
The terms of reference of the group do not make any mention of developing recommendations for disciplining the use of contingent protection.
IV. Free Trade and Deep Integration in Regional Agreements
The regional experience to date illustrates that PTAs vary on many dimensions. Of primary interest here is whether PTAs achieve full shallow integration (free trade) (or at least have this as 29 an objective) and whether shallow integration was conditional on the pursuit of deeper integration, particularly the adoption of common antitrust rules.
If shallow integration is defined as unconditional free trade in goods (including the elimination of antidumping), only four of the agreements qualify: the EC, EEA, CER and Canada-Chile (Table 1 ). This will increase to five if MERCOSUR members decide to abolish antidumping in 2000. If the definition of shallow integration includes freedom of movement of labor and capital, only the EC, the EEA and CER qualify. 35 Four of these PTAs have adopted common rules in the area of antitrust: the EC, EEA, CER and MERCOSUR. In all cases this is part of a broader competition policy agenda, including disciplines on industrial policy. Table I here
There are significant differences in approaches. ANZCERTA involves significant harmonization of antitrust legislation and agreements allowing enforcement of national law in the other nation's jurisdiction. In contrast, the EC was not aimed at harmonization of national legal regimes. Instead, the objective of market integration is pursued through adoption of common competition disciplines for practices that restrain trade, enforcement by a supranational body and application of the principle of direct effect of EC law. The focus on trade effects was driven by the concern that private practices not be permitted to segment national markets. Both CER and MERCOSUR are similar to the EC in applying a trade effects criterion.
The close overlap between the agreements that have achieved shallow integration (or are seeking to do so) and those that have common antitrust rules does not indicate there is a relationship between the two. In the EU and EEA context abolition of antidumping was accompanied with not only complete liberalization of trade in goods, services and factors of 35/ Formally, as noted above, CER does not incorporate a right of establishment, but in practice cross-investment is relatively unconstrained.
production (shallow integration), but also coordination and substantial harmonization of competition policies, including disciplines on government procurement, state aids (subsidies) and entities granted exclusive rights. Indeed, it now appears that as far as the EU is concerned, a country must adopt all of its internal market rules before the EU will remove the reach of its "commercial defense" instruments. But there is not direct link between abolition of antidumping and adoption of common antitrust rules. The focus of the EU (and the EEA) is on the creation of a single market, and that has been the main factor underlying the elimination of antidumping. 36
Although market integration is somewhat less-reaching in the Australia-New Zealand CER agreement, it also has a "Single Market" dimension, illustrated by a common labor market, disciplines on the use of subsidies, and mutual recognition agreements for product standards.
Here again the basic premise was that there was no scope to maintain antidumping if the objective was to attain a single trans-Tasman market. The concern underlying cooperation and convergence in antitrust was to ensure that similar rules would apply to anticompetitive practices with a detrimental impact on intra-area trade. Dumping did not figure prominently in this context. Table 2 here As illustrated in Table 2 , all possible permutations of shallow and deep integration can be found in PTAs. Agreement to coordinate or even agree on common antitrust rules is neither necessary or sufficient to allow antidumping to be eliminated. Even far-reaching regulatory commitments (deep integration) that extend beyond antitrust per se may not be sufficient to 36/ The weakness of the link is also illustrated by the fact that the conditions for elimination of antidumping are not spelled out clearly in the EU's free trade agreements with East European and Mediterranean countries. There is no language linking the elimination of antidumping to the implementation of competition policy disciplines broadly defined. A decision to eliminate the reach of antidumping is left firmly in the political domain.
make elimination of antidumping feasible (e.g., the Europe Agreements). 3 7 Examples can also be found where intra-regional free trade was attained without any move towards incorporation of rules on antitrust regimes (e.g., Canada-Chile). Finally, antitrust authorities have also pursued formal bilateral agreements independent of the existence of PTAs.
Although it is difficult to say anything definitive concerning the necessary or sufficient conditions for the abolition of antidumping, a number of conclusions can be drawn. First, explicit linkages between abolition of antidumping and adoption of common antitrust rules are not prevalent. Second, antidumping may be used as a tool to extract concessions from potential partner countries (e.g., the Europe Agreements; the Euro-Med Agreements). Third, if members of a PTA aim at the creation of a single market, there can be no role for antidumping. Although common antitrust disciplines may be adopted as part of a deeper integration effort, this is driven by the integration objective, not by a perception that such disciplines are required to abolish antidumping. Fourth, much may depend on the extent to which a PTA imposes disciplines on the ability of governments to directly intervene in or support domestic industries. This seems to be one of the major concerns underlying the EU's unwillingness to give up its right to impose antidumping duties on imports from Central European and Mediterranean countries. The fact that NAFTA did little to impose disciplines on subsidies may be an important element in the US unwillingness to give up antidumping. 3 8 Canada-Chile is also noteworthy in this connection in that countervailing duties remain applicable.
37/ In the case of the Europe Agreements, deep integration is part of the "price" to be paid by Central European nations to obtain duty-free access to the EC market and increase the likelihood that at some point in the future unconditional free trade will be attained (ultimately through accession).
38/ Of course, in principle countervailing duties are the legal instrument that should be used in this context, but in practice it is well known that antidumping and countervail are substitutes, with firms frequently expressing a preference for antidumping (Leidy, 1997) .
Finally, it can be noted that PTAs have done little in the way of adopting approaches that are aimed at the gradual elimination of the instrument. Instead, abolition is either a dichotomous event-here one day, gone the next-or there is a transition period, usually linked to the elimination of tariffs more generally, after which it may not be used. No use has been made of mechanisms of the type that have been proposed in the trade policy literature to introduce competition criteria into the antidumping process. Such options include introduction of an "injury to competition" standards or a requirement that the importing country's competition authorities is given the mandate to block the imposition of antidumping measures if this would endanger competition on the market. 3 9 This also suggests the absence of strong link between elimination of antidumping and antitrust disciplines.
V.
Implications for Multilateral Disciplines on Regional Agreements
GATT Article XXIV allows for the formation of PTAs between WTO members as long as these meet a number of conditions. One of these is that "duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce ... are eliminated with respect to substantially all trade between the constituent territories (Art. XXIV:8a). The only exceptions concern quantitative restrictions that satisfy GATT provisions (e.g., agriculture, balance of payments, and health or safety considerations).
As no mention is made in Art. XXIV of antidumping as a valid exception, strictly speaking PTAs maintaining this instrument are "illegal" (being a form of restrictive regulation of commerce) (Mavroidis, 1996) . How members of a PTA eliminate existing restrictions on commerce is not specified by Article XXIV. Thus, they are free to make cooperation in the area of antitrust a precondition for the elimination of antidumping if they desire to do so, but are certainly not required 3.2/ For more detailed discussion of these and other options, see, e.g., Wood (1989) , Morris (1993) , Messerlin (1994 Messerlin ( , 1996 , Hoekman and Mavroidis (1996) and Sch6ne (1996) .
to. It could be argued that if deep integration is required to achieve unconditional free trade, Art.
XXIV:8 cannot be held to have been violated as the WTO does not extend to deep integration.
But many analysts have argued that regional agreements should only be tolerated on systemic grounds if they go beyond the rules and disciplines of the WTO (see, e.g., Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1996) . Insofar deep integration is a (political) requirement to eliminate the reach of antidumping, this would imply that the PTA does go beyond the WTO. The same conclusion applies if deep integration is not required and one accepts the argument that antidumping is a perfectly legitimate exception to Art. XXIV:8. In that case, a prohibition on antidumping would also go beyond the WTO, thus satisfying the criterion.
Most of the PTAs notified to the GATT/WTO Secretariat over the years have not resulted in the elimination of contingent protection (if this existed) and have not included a transition period during which this was to be achieved. 40 Despite this, there has never been an instance where a GATT working party disapproved of a PTA because of the continued existence of antidumping. Of course, this no doubt reflects the more general weakness of the WTO process.
In any event, abstracting from the political constraints affecting scrutiny of PTAs in the WTO context, the most straightforward solution to the problem of antidumping in the PTA context would be to require that to be compatible with the WTO any PTA should abolish the reach of contingent protection on intra-area trade VI.
Concluding Remarks
The regional experience illustrates that shallow integration--unconditional free trade--may be associated with the pursuit of a deeper integration agenda. However, arguments that common or 40/ Marceau (1994, pp. 147ff ).
similar antitrust rules are a necessary condition for the elimination of antidumping do not have a strong economic foundation and are only weakly supported by the regional evidence. The linkages that are sometimes argued to exist in practice between antidumping elimination and enforcement of common antitrust disciplines tend to be driven by a broader agenda that revolves around the attainment of greater economic integration (e.g., the "single" market goal of the EC, EEA and CER).
All the PTAs that have led to the abolition of antidumping, or are moving in that direction, go beyond the WTO in at least some important respects. This is also the case for the Canada-Chile agreement, which is NAFTA-like in the extent of its disciplines in the investrnent area. One can conclude from the available evidence that although agreement on common antitrust disciplines is not necessary to eliminate antidumping, common disciplines in other regulatory areas affecting competition between firms in each jurisdiction may be needed to completely remove the reach of contingent protection. The Canada-Chile agreement is again suggestive in this connection, as there are no strong disciplines on the use of subsidies and consequently countervailing duties continue to be applicable. In practice therefore, it may be that the demise of antidumping in PTAs is constrained because governments are concerned about the potential for their partners to engage in beggar thy neighbor industrial policies. They may consider antidumping a useful defensive instrument in this connection, because it can be used as a substitute for instruments like countervailing duties which have a much higher "foreign policy content" and may be more difficult to pursue. If so, it must be recognized that antidumping is a particularly ineffective and costly instrument. Indeed, a case can be made that this is another reason to eliminate it in the PTA context as this will help focus attention on the real source of problems (industrial policies; government intervention), rather than on the symptoms (allegations of "unfair dumping").
35
Experience has revealed that antidumping can be eliminated in the regional context. The burden of proof should therefore be put on those that argue for the maintenance of this instrument in a PTA. Existing WTO rules in this connection appear unambiguous in requiring that all duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce must be eliminated in a PTA. Given the pervasive spread of PTAs, perhaps a start could be made to reduce the reach of antidumping by beginning to take the existing provisions of the WTO more seriously. 
